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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the existence of equilibria in an abstract economy with compact
n w xstrategy sets in R was proved in a seminal paper of Debreu 4 which is
classical Arrow]Debreu]McKenzie model of exchange economies under
perfect information competition, there have been many generalizations of
w x w xDebreu's theorem by Aliprantis and Brown 1 , Borglin and Keiding 3 ,
w x w x w x w xDing and Tan 5 , Gale and Mas-Colell 9 , Kim 11 , Kim and Lee 12 ,
w x w x w xShafer and Sonnenschein 14 , Tan and Yuan 15 , Tarafdar 16 , Toussaint
w x w x w x w x w x17 , Tulcea 18 , Wu 19 , Wu and Shen 20 , Yannelis and Prabhakar 22 ,
w x w x w x w x w xYannelis 21 , Yuan 23 , Yuan and Tarafdar 24 , Zheng 25 , Zhou 26 ,
and many others. Even several different kinds of mappings have been
Ž Ž ..introduced such as class of L resp., L*, L , L X, Y, u , L -majorizedF F
Ž Ž . . Ž w x w x w x w xresp., L*, L , L X, Y, u -majorized e.g., see 5 , 15 , 18 , 22 , and
.others , and a number of existence theorems of equilibria for generalized
Ž .games resp., abstract economics have been established; however, note
that almost all of those results so far established in the literature need
some assumptions such as either preference mappings or constraint map-
Ž .pings are lower semicontinuous, or the set of players resp., agents is
Ž .countable and strategic resp., commodity spaces need to be compact. On
the other hand, in order to allow people to study general equilibrium
problems involving infinite time horizons, we need to study general exis-
Žtence problems of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract eco-
. Ž .nomics in which the strategic resp., commodity spaces are infinitely
Ždimensional, and the set of players resp., agents, or states of world, or
.varieties of commodity characteristics is infinite and even uncountable.
Moreover we do know that there exist many constraint mappings which are
only upper semicontinuous instead of having lower semicontinuity and also
there do exist preference mappings which do not have lower semicontinu-
Ž w x w x w x .ity e.g., see 1 , 2 , 21 , and related references therein . Motivated by
those facts, by using approximate techniques for upper semicontinuous
set-valued mappings in locally topological vector spaces, the purpose of
this paper is to establish general existence results of maximal elements for
L-majorized mappings, which are, in turn, used to establish the general
Žexistence theorems of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract
.economics without lower semicontinuity for both constraint and prefer-
Ž . Žence mappings correspondences and in which strategic resp., commod-
. Ž .ity spaces may not be compact, the set of players resp., agents may not
be countable, and underlying spaces are either finite or infinite dimen-
sional locally topological vector spaces. Our results unify or improve
corresponding results in the literature.
In order to expose clearly the idea and method we used in this paper, we
only focus on the study of so-called L-majorized mappings which have
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been used and discussed extensively in mathematical economics in the last
more than two decades, though the method used in this paper might be
applicable for a more broad class of mappings such as, for example, KF
w xmappings discussed by Yuan and Tarafdar 24 and others.
Now we recall or introduce some notions and definitions. Throughout
this paper, all topological spaces are assumed to be Hausdorff unless
otherwise specified. Let A be a subset of a topological space X. We
A Ž .denote by 2 the family of all subsets of A, by int A the interior of AX
Ž .in X, and by cl A the closure of A in X. The subset A is said to beX
compactly open in X if for each nonempty compact subset C of X, A l C
is open in C. If A is a subset of a vector space E, we shall denote by co A
E Žthe convex hull of A. If S, T : A “ 2 are two set-valued mappings or,
. Esay, correspondences , then co T , T l S: A “ 2 are correspondences
Ž .Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž . Ž .defined by co T x s co T x and T l S x s T x l S x for each
x g A, respectively, and dom S denotes the domain of S, i.e., dom S [
 Ž . 4x g X : S x / B . If X and Y are topological spaces and T : X “
2Y is a correspondence, the graph of T , denoted by graph T , is the set
YŽ . Ž .4x, y g X = Y: y g T x and the correspondence T : X “ 2 is defined
Ž .  Ž . 4 Žby T x s y g Y: x, y g cl Graph T the set cl Graph T isX=Y X=Y
. Ycalled the adherence of the graph of T , and cl T : X “ 2 is defined by
Ž . Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž .cl T x s cl T x for each x g X. It is easy to see that cl T x ; T xX
for each x g X.
In this paper, by using the so-called approximate method which has been
w xinitially used by Tan and Yuan 15 , we will focus on the study of
generalized games in which the preference mappings are so-called L-
majorized mappings, whose roots could be found from Borglin and Keid-
w x w x Žing's paper 3 and Yannelis and Prabhakar 22 for more recent studies,
w x w x w x w x .see 17 , 18 , 5 , 15 , and references therein . By following the idea of
w xYannelis and Prabhakar 22 , we first have the notion of L-majorized
mappings as follows. Let X be a topological space, let Y be a nonempty
Ž .subset of a vector space E, let u : X “ E be a single-valued mapping,
and let f : X “ 2Y be a correspondence. Then we have that:
Ž . Ž . Ž .1 f is said to be of class L if a for each x g X, co f x ; Yu , C
Ž . Ž . Ž . y1Ž .and u x f co f x and b for each y g Y, f y is compactly open
in X ;
Ž . Ž . Y2 f , N is an L -majorant of f at x if f : X “ 2 and N isx x u , C x x
Ž . Ž .an open neighborhood of x in X such that a for each z g N , f z ;x
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .f z , b for each z g N , u z f co f z , and c for each y g Y,x x x
y1Ž .f y is compactly open in X ;x
Ž . Ž .3 f is said to be L -majorized if for each x g X with f x / B,u , C
Ž .there exists an L -majorant f , N of f at x.u x x
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We note that our notions of the mapping P being of class L andu , C
w x w xL -majorized have been used by Ding and Tan 5 , Tan and Yuan 15 ,u , C
w x Ž .and Zhou 26 , which in turn generalize the notions of f g C X, Y, u and
w xC-majorized mappings introduced by Tulcea 18 and a related one of
w xYannelis and Prabhakar 22 as special cases.
Ž .In this paper, we shall deal mainly with either case I X s Y, which is a
nonempty convex subset of the topological vector space E and u s I , theX
Ž .identity map on X, or case II X s Ł X and u s p : X “ X is theig I i j j
projection of X onto X and Y s X is a nonempty convex subset of aj j
Ž . Ž .topological vector space. In both cases I and II , we shall write L in
Ž .place of L . Let I be a possibly uncountable set of players. For eachu , C
i g I, let its choice or strategy set X be a nonempty subset of ai
topological vector space. Let X s Ł X . For each i g I, let P : X “ 2 X iig I i i
w xbe a correspondence. Following the notion of Gale and Mas-Colell 9 , the
Ž .collection G s X , P is said to be a qualitative game. A point x g XÃi i ig I
is said to be an equilibrium of the game G if
P x s BŽ .Ãi
for all i g I. For each i g I, let A be a nonempty subset of X . Then, fori i
 Ž .each fixed k g I, we define Ł A m A s x s x : x g A forjg I, j/ k j k i ig I i i
4all i g I .
Ž .A generalized game resp., abstract economy is a family of quadruples
G s X ; A , B ; P ,Ž .i i i i igI
Ž . Ž .where I is a possibly uncountable set of players resp., agents such that,
for each i g I, X is a nonempty subset of a topological vector space andi
A , B : X s P X “ 2 X i are constraint correspondences and P : X “i i jg I j i
X i  42 is a preference correspondence. When I s 1, . . . , N , where N is a
Ž .positive integer, G s X ; A , B ; P is also called an N-person game.i i i i ig I
An equilibrium of G is a point x g X such that, for each i g I,Ã
x s p x g B x and A x l P x s B.Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ã Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i i
Ž . Ž . ŽWe remark that when B x s cl B x which is the case when cl BÃ Ãi X i X ii i
has a closed graph in X = X ; in particular, when B is upper semicontinu-i i
.ous with closed values , our definition of an equilibrium point coincides
w xwith that of Ding and Tan 5 ; and if, in addition, A s B for each i g I,i i
our definition of an equilibrium point coincides with the standard defini-
w x w x w xtion, e.g., in Borglin and Keiding 3 , Tarafdar 16 , Tulcea 18 , and
w xYannelis and Prabhakar 22 .
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2. THE EXISTENCE OF SELECTIONS FOR
L-MAJORIZED MAPPINGS
In this section, we first have the following existence of L-class mappings
for L-majorized mappings in topological vector spaces.
THEOREM 2.1. Let X be a regular topological ¤ector space and let Y be a
nonempty subset of a ¤ector space E. Let u : X “ E and P: X “ 2Y be
L -majorized. If the domain set of the mapping P is open and paracompact,u , C
Y Ž . Ž .then there exists an L -class mapping f: X “ 2 such that P x ; f xu , C
for each x g X.
Proof. Since P is L -majorized, for each x g B, let N be an openu , C x
neighborhood of x in X and let f : X “ 2Y be a set-valued mapping suchx
Ž . Ž . Ž Ž .. Ž . Ž . Ž .that 1 for each z g N , u z f co f z ; 2 for each z g N x , P z ;x x
Ž . Ž . Ž . y1Ž .f z , and co f z ; Y; 3 for each y g Y, f y is compactly open inx x x
X. Note that X is regular; for each x g B, there exists an open neighbor-
hood G of x in X such that cl G ; N . Let G s D G . Then G isx X x x x g B x
 Ž . 4an open subset of X which contains B s x g X : P x / B . Note that B
is open in X, without loss of generality, we may assume that G s B
Ž .otherwise, taking the set G l B, which is indeed the same set as B . By
the paracompactness assumption on B and Theorem VIII.1.4 of Dugundji
w x  46, p. 162 , the open covering G of G has an open precise neighborhood-x
 X 4finite refinement G . Given any x g B, we define a set-valued mappingx
fX : G “ 2Y byx
f z , if z g G l cl GX ,Ž .x X xXf z sŽ . Xx ½ Y , if z g G _ cl G ,X x
Ž .then we have that i for each y g Y, the set
y1Xf yŽ . Ž .x
s z g G: y g fX z 4Ž .x
s z g G l cl GX : y g fX z j z g G _ cl GX : y g fX z 4  4Ž . Ž .X x x X x x
X  X 4s z g G l cl G : y g f z j z g G _ cl G : y g Y 4Ž .X x x X x
X Xy1s G l cl G l f y j G _ cl GŽ . Ž . Ž .X x x X x
s G l fy1 y j G _ cl GX .Ž . Ž .Ž .x X x
Ž X .y1Ž .It follows that, for each nonempty compact subset C of X, f y lx
Ž y1Ž . . ŽŽ X . . Ž .C s G l f y l C j G _ cl G l C is open in C by 3 . Nowx X x
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define f : X “ 2Y by
¡ Xf z , if z g G,Ž .F x~f z sŽ . xgB¢B, if z g X _ G.
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Let z g X be given. Clearly 2 implies P z ; f z and co f z ; Y for
Ž . X Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .all z g X. As u z f co f z by 1 we must have u z f co f z .x
Ž . Ž .Therefore u z f co f z for all z g X. Now we show that, for each
y1Ž .y g Y, f y is compactly open in X. Indeed, let y g Y be such that
y1Ž .f y / B and let C be a compact subset of X ; fix an arbitrary
y1Ž .  Ž .4  Ž .4u g f y l C s z g X : y g f z l C s z g G: y g f z l C.
 X 4Since G is a neighborhood-finite refinement, there exists an openx
 X 4neighborhood M of u in G such that x g B: M l G / B su u x
 4  4 Xx , . . . , x . Note that for each x g B with x f x , . . . , x , B s M l G1 n 1 n u x
X X Ž . Ž .s M l cl G so that f z s Y for all z g M . Thus we have f z su X x x u
X Ž . n X Ž .F f z s F f z for all z g M . It follows thatx g B x is1 x ui
fy1 y s z g X : y g f z 4Ž . Ž .
s z g G: y g fX z > z g M : y g fX zŽ . Ž .F Fx u x½ 5 ½ 5
xgB xgB
n
Xs z g M : y g f zŽ .Fu x i½ 5
is1
n
Xs M l z g G: y g f zŽ .Fu x i½ 5
is1
n
y1Xs M l f y .Ž .Ž .Fu x i
is1
X w n Ž X .y1Ž .xBut M s M l F c y l C is an open neighborhood of u in Cu u is1 x iX y1Ž . Ž X .y1Ž .such that M ; f y l C since c y is compactly open in X. Thisu x iy1Ž .shows that, for each y g Y, f y is compactly open in X. Thus f is of
class L and the proof is complete.u
Ž .Condition C . Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a topological
vector space E. Throughout this paper, a set-valued mapping P: X “ 2 X
is said to satisfy the following noncompact condition: If there exist a
Žnonempty compact and convex subset X and a nonempty compact not0
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.necessarily convex subset K of X such that, for each y g X _ K, we have
Ž . Ž  4.that co P y l co X j y / B.0
To establish the existence of maximal elements, we first have the
following generalization of the Fan]Browder fixed point theorem which is,
w xindeed, Lemma 1 of Ding and Tan 5, p. 228 . For the convenience of
readers, we give the outline of its proof as applications of Fan's geometric
w xlemma in 8 which is an infinite dimensional version of the famous KKM
w xprinciple in 13 .
THEOREM 2.2. Let X be a nonempty con¤ex subset of a topological ¤ector
Ž . X  4space not necessarily Hausdorff and let G: X “ 2 _ B be a set-¤alued
Ž y1Ž .mapping with compactly open in¤erse i.e., the set G y is compactly open
.in X for each y g X and the mapping G satisfies the noncompact Condition
Ž .C , i.e., there exist a nonempty compact and con¤ex subset X and a0
Ž .nonempty compact not necessarily con¤ex subset K of X such that, for each
Ž  4. Ž .x g X _ K, we ha¤e that co X j x l co G x / B.0
Ž .Then there exists x g X such that x g co G x .
Proof. Suppose the conclusion were false. Then, for each x g X, we
Ž . Xhave that x f co G x . Let F: X “ 2 be a set-valued mapping defined
Ž . Ž . Ž .by F x s co G x for each x g X. Then F x is nonempty and convex
y1Ž .for each x g X. By our assumption, it is easy to verify that F y is
y1Ž .compactly open in X as G y is compactly open in X for each y g X. It
then follows that
X s Fy1 y .Ž .D
ygX
By the noncompact condition, there exists a nonempty compact convex
subset X of X and a nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for0
Ž  4. Ž .each y g X _ K, there is an x g co X j y with x g F y . Now we0
define a set-valued mapping T : X “ 2 X by
T x s X _ Fy1 x l KŽ . Ž .Ž .
 Ž . 4for each x g X. We shall prove that the family T x : x g X has the
 4finite interaction property. Let x , . . . , x be any nonempty finite subset1 n
Ž  4.of X. Let D s co X j x , . . . , x . Then D is also compact and convex0 1 n
and define T : D “ 2 D by0
T x s X _ Fy1 x l DŽ . Ž .Ž .0
Ž . Ž .for each x g D. Then we have that a for each x g D, x g T x as0
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .x f F x , so that T x is nonempty and T x is compact in D; b we0 0
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can also show that T is a KKM mapping; i.e., the convex hull of each0
 4finite subset u , . . . , u of D is contained in the corresponding union1 m
m Ž . w x ŽD T u . Now by Lemma 1 of Fan 8 as we note that the assumptionis1 0 i
.``Hausdorff'' is not necessary in its proof , it follows that
T x s X _ Fy1 x l D / B.Ž . Ž .Ž .F F0
xgD xgD
Ž y1Ž ..Take any y g F X _ F x l D. Then we have that y must be inÃ Ãx g D i
n Ž y1Ž .. n Ž .  Ž .K. Hence, y g F X _ F x l K s F T x ; i.e., the family T x :Ã is1 i is1 i
4x g X has the finite intersection property. By the compactness of K, it
Ž . Ž y1Ž ..follows that F T X / B, that is, F X _ F x l K / B. Takex g X 0 x g X
Ž y1Ž .. y1Ž .any y g F X _ F x . It follows that y g X _ F x s B, whichx g X
y1Ž .is impossible as we get that X s D F y above. Therefore our claimy g X
Ž .``x f co G x for all x g X '' is impossible and the conclusion must hold;
Ž .i.e., there exists at least one x g X such that x g co G x .
As applications of both Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, we have the following
existence of maximal elements for L-majorized mappings in topological
vector spaces which will play the most important role in the study of
general existence of equilibria for generalized games throughout this
paper.
THEOREM 2.3. Let X be a nonempty paracompact con¤ex subset of a
topological ¤ector space. Suppose the mapping P: X “ 2 X is L-majorized
Ž . Ž .and satisfies Condition C . Then there exists an x g K such that P x s B;Ã Ã
i.e., x is a maximal element of P.Ã
Ž .Proof. Suppose that the conclusion does not hold, then P x / B for
all x g X and dom P s X is paracompact. By Theorem 2.1, there exists an
X Ž . Ž . Ž .L-class mapping f : X “ 2 such that 1 P x ; f x for each x g X ;
Ž . Ž . Ž . y1Ž .2 x f co f x for each x g X ; and 3 f y is compactly open in X
Ž .for all y g X. Note that P satisfies Condition C , so does f. Therefore
the mapping f satisfies all hypotheses of Theorem 2.2. By Theorem 2.2,
Ž .there exists a point x g X such that x g co f x , which is a contradiction.
Ž .Thus there must exist x g X such that P x s B. By the noncompact0 0
Ž .Condition C , it follows that x must be in K.Ã
3. THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA FOR GENERALIZED
GAMES WITHOUT LOWER SEMICONTINUITY
FOR CONSTRAINT MAPPINGS
w xTo apply the approximate method initially used by Tan and Yuan 15
Ž w x.see also 18 , we first recall some definitions and some results about
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approximation for upper semicontinuous set-valued mappings, due to
w xTulcea 18 .
Let X be a subset of a topological vector space E. By following Tulcea
w x Ž .18 , the set X is said to have the property K if, for every compact subset
B of X, the convex hull co B is relatively compact in E. It is clear that
Ž .each compact convex set in a Hausdorff resp., locally topological vector
Ž .space always has property K . Let X and Y be two topological spaces and
let F: X “ 2Y be a set-valued mapping. Then the mapping F is said to be
Ž .compact if, for any x g X, there exists an open neighborhood N x such
Ž Ž .. Ž .that F N x s D F y is relatively compact in Y.y g NŽ x .
Let X be a nonempty set, let Y be a nonempty subset of a topological
Y w xvector space E, and let F: X “ 2 . As in Tulcea 18, p. 269 , a family
Ž .f of correspondences between X and Y, indexed by a nonemptyj jg J
Ž .filtering set J denote by F the order relation in J , is an upper approx-
imating family for F if
Ž . Ž . Ž .1 F x ; f x for all x g X and all j g J;j
Ž .2 for each j g J there is a j* g J such that, for each h G j* and
Ž . Ž .h g J, f x ; f x for each x g X ;h j
and
Ž .3 for each x g X and V g B, where B is a base for the zero
Ž . Ž .neighborhood in E, there is a j g J such that f x ; F x q V ifx, V h
h g J and j F h.x, V
Ž . Ž .From 1 ] 3 , it is easy to deduce that:
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .4 for each x g X and k g J, F x ; F f x s F f xjg J j k F j, k g J j
Ž . Ž .; cl F x ; F x .
A set-valued mapping F: X “ 2Y is said to be quasi-regular if
Ž . y1Ž .a it has open lower sections, i.e., F y is open in X for each
y g Y;
Ž . Ž .b F x is nonempty and convex for each x g X ;
Ž . Ž . Ž .c F x s cl F x for each x g X.
The set-valued mapping F is said to be regular if it is quasi-regular and
has an open graph.
wBy observing Theorem 3 and the Remark of Tulcea 18, p. 280 and
xpp. 281]282 , we have the following:
Ž .LEMMA 3.1. Let X be a family of paracompact spaces and leti ig I
Ž .Y be a family of nonempty closed con¤ex subsets, each in a locallyi ig I
Ž .con¤ex Hausdorff topological ¤ector space and each has property K . For
each i g I, let F : X “ 2Yi be compact and upper semicontinuous withi i
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nonempty and compact con¤ex ¤alues. Then there is a common filtering set J
Ž . Ž .independent of i g I such that, for each i g I, there is a family f ofi j jg J
correspondences between X and Y with the following properties:i i
Ž .i for each j g J, f is regular;i j
Ž . Ž .ii f and f are upper approximating families for F ;Ž .i j jg J i j ijg J
Ž .iii for each j g J, f is continuous if Y is compact.i j i
Now we shall first establish the following existence for equilibria for a
so-called one-person game.
Ž .THEOREM 3.2. Let X, F, G, P be a one-person game and strategic set X
a nonempty paracompact con¤ex subset of a Hausdorff locally topological
¤ector space such that
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . y1Ž .i for each x g X, F x / B and co F x ; G x and F y is
compactly open in X for each y g X ;
Ž .ii the preference mapping P is such that F l P is L-majorized;
Ž .iii there exist a nonempty compact con¤ex subset X of X and a0
nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each x g X _ K, we ha¤e that
Ž  4. Ž Ž . Ž ..co X j x l co F x l P x / B.0
Ž . Ž . Ž .Then there exists a point x g K such that x g G x and F x l P x s B.Ã Ã Ã Ã Ã
 Ž .4Proof. Let M s x g X : x f G x . Then M is open in X. Define a
set-valued mapping C: X “ 2 X by
F x l P x , if x f M ,Ž . Ž .
C x sŽ . ½ F x , if x g M .Ž .
Ž Ž . Ž . .Case 1. Suppose x g M it follows that C x s F x / B . Let f s Fx
Ž .and N s M. Then N is an open neighborhood of x in X such that ax x
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .for each z g N , C z s F z s f z , z f G z so that z f co F z sx x
Ž . Ž . y1Ž . y1Ž .co f z ; b for each y g X, f y s F y is compactly open in X byx x
Ž .condition i . Thus f is an L-majorant of C at the point x in X.x
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Case 2. Suppose x f M and C x / B. Then C x s F x l P x /
B. As F l P is L-majorized, there exist an open neighborhood N of x inx
X X Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . X Ž .X and a mapping f : X “ 2 such that a c z s F z l P z ; f zx x
Ž X Ž .. Ž .and z f co f z for each z g N and b for each y g X, the setx x
Ž X .y1Ž . Xf y is compactly open in X. Define F : X “ 2 byx x
F z l fX z , if z f M ,Ž . Ž .x
F z sŽ .x ½ F z , if x g M .Ž .
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Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Note that 1 for each z g N , clearly C z ; F z and z f co F z ,x x x
Ž . y1Ž . w Ž X .y1Ž .x y1Ž .and 2 for each y g X, F y s M j f y l F y , which isx x
compactly open in X. Hence F is an L-majorant of C at the point x inx
Ž .X. Therefore C is an L-majorized mapping. Moreover by condition iii ,
Ž  4. Ž Ž . Ž ..for each x g X _ K, there exists y g co X j x l co F x l P x such0
Ž Ž . Ž .. Ž .that y g co F x l P x ; co C x . By the paracompact assumption of
X and the existence of maximal elements for L-majorized mappings in
topological vector spaces, e.g., Theorem 2.3 above, it follows that there
Ž . Ž .exists x g K such that C x s B. As F x / B for all x g X, it followsÃ Ã Ã
Ž . Ž . Ž .we must have that x f M, i.e., x g G x and F x l P x s B. ThisÃ Ã Ã Ã Ã
completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Now as applications of Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we have the
following existence theorem of equilibria for a one-person game in which
the constraint correspondences are only upper semicontinuous.
THEOREM 3.3. Let the strategic set X be a nonempty paracompact closed
Ž .and con¤ex with property K in a Hausdorff locally topological ¤ector space
and let F, P: X “ 2 X be two set-¤alued mappings such that
Ž .i the constraint mapping F is compact and upper semicontinuous
with nonempty compact and con¤ex ¤alues;
Ž .ii the preference mapping P is L-majorized;
Ž .iii the domain of the mapping F l P is open in X, i.e, the set
 Ž . Ž . 4E [ x g X : F x l P x / B is open in X ;
Ž .iv there exist a nonempty compact con¤ex subset X of X and a0
nonempty compact subset of K of X such that, for each x g X _ K, we ha¤e
Ž  4. Ž Ž . Ž ..that co X j x l co F x l P x / B.0
Ž . Ž . Ž .Then there exists a point x g K such that x g F x and F x l P x s B.Ã Ã Ã Ã Ã
 4Proof. By Lemma 3.1, there exists a family F of regular mappingsj
 4  4from X to X such that both F and F are upper approximatingj jg J j jg J
families of F. Let j g J be arbitrarily fixed. Note that each F has an openj
graph and the mapping F l P is also L-majorized as P is L-majorized byj
Ž . Ž .condition ii . Thus the game G s X, F , F , P satisfies all hypotheses ofj j j
Theorem 3.1. By Theorem 3.1, it follows that there exists x g K such thatÃj
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .F x l P x s B and x g F x . Since F x ; F x , it follows thatÃ Ã Ã Ã Ã Ãj j j j j j j j j
Ž . Ž .  4F x l P x s B. Note that x is a net in the compact set K ;Ã Ã Ãj j j jg J
without loss of generality, we may assume that x converges to some pointj
Ž . Ž .x* g K. By properties 2 and 4 of the upper approximating family
U Ž .defined above, it follows that x g F x* for each j g J as the graph of Fj j j
Ž . Ž . Ž .is closed. By condition iii , as F x l P x s B for all j g J, i.e., x f EÃ Ã Ãj j j
for all j g J and E is open, it follows that x* f E, thus we have that
Ž . Ž .F x* l P x* s B. Therefore the proof of Theorem 3.2 is complete.
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As a special case of Theorem 3.3, we have the following result which
includes corresponding results in the literature as a special case.
THEOREM 3.4. Let the strategic set X be a nonempty compact and con¤ex
set in a Hausdorff locally topological ¤ector space and let F, P: X “ 2 X be
two set-¤alued mappings such that
Ž .i the constraint mapping F is upper semicontinuous with nonempty
closed and con¤ex ¤alues;
Ž .ii the preference mapping P is L-majorized;
Ž .iii the domain of the mapping F l P is open in X.
Ž . Ž . Ž .Then there exists a point x g K such that x g F x and F x l P x s B.Ã Ã Ã Ã Ã
Our goal is to establish the general existence of equilibria for any
Ž . Ž .number countable or uncountable players resp., agents without lower
semicontinuity; as an application of Theorem 2.3 we first have the follow-
Ž .ing existence of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract economy
in topological vector spaces in which the constraint mapping A hasi
compactly open inverse for each i g I.
Ž . ŽTHEOREM 3.5. Let G s X , A , B , P be a generalized game resp.,i i i i ig I
.abstract economy , where I is any countable or uncountable set of players.
Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied for each i g I:
Ž .i the strategic set X is a nonempty con¤ex subset of a topologicali
¤ector space;
Ž . Ž .ii for each x g X, the constraint mapping A x is nonempty andi
Ž . Ž . y1Ž .co A x ; B x , and A has compactly open in¤erse; i.e., the set A y si i i
 Ž .4x g X : y g A x is compactly open in X for each y g X ;i i
Ž . X iiii the preference mapping P : X “ 2 is such that the mappingi
A l P : X “ 2 X i is L-majorized;i i
Ž .  Ž . 4iv the set E s x g X : A l P x / B is open in X ;i i i
Ž .  4v the family A l P satisfies the noncompact condition;i i ig I
i.e., there exist a nonempty compact con¤ex subset X of X and a non-0
empty compact subset K of X such that, for each y g X _ K, there is an x g
Ž  4. Ž Ž Ž ..co X j y with x g co A y l P y for all i g I.0 i i i
Ž . Ž . Ž .Then there exists x g X such that x g B x and A x l P x s B for eachi i i i
i g I.
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 Ž .4Proof. For each i g I, let F s x g X : x g B x . Then the set F isi i i i
closed in X. We now define Q : X “ 2 X i byi
A l P x , if x g F ,Ž . Ž .i i i iQ x sŽ .i ½ co A x , if x f F .Ž .i i
w xBy following the same proof as that of Theorem 3 from Ding and Tan 5
Ž . Ž .and conditions ii ] v , we can show that the qualitative game G s
Ž . Ž .X , Q satisfies the following properties: a the preference mappingi i ig I
X i Ž .  Ž . 4Q : X “ 2 is L-majorized; b D x g X : P x / B s Di ig I i ig I
 Ž . 4 Ž .  4i nt x g X : P x / B ; and c the family Q satisfies the noncompacti i ig I
Ž .Condition C ; i.e., there exist a nonempty compact convex subset X of X0
and a nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each y g X _ K,
Ž  4. Ž .there is an x g co X j y with x g co P y for all i g I.0 i i
Ž .  Ž . 4Second, for each x g X, let I x [ i g I: Q x / B and we define ai
set-valued mapping P: X “ 2 X by
¡ XQ x , if I x / B,Ž . Ž .F i~Q x sŽ . Ž .igI x¢
B, otherwise;
XŽ . Ž .where Q x [ Ł X m Q x for each x g X. By employing argu-i j/ i, jg I j i
w xments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 3 in Ding and Tan 5 ,
we can also show that the mapping Q is L-majorized by using properties
Ž . Ž . Ž .a and b of the qualitative game G s X , Q above. By the noncom-i i ig I
pact condition, it follows that all hypotheses of Theorem 2.3 are satisfied.
By Theorem 2.3, it follows that there exists a point x g K such that
Ž . Ž .Q x s B, which implies that Q x s B for all i g I. Since, for eachi
Ž . Ž . Ž .x g X, A x / B, therefore we must have that x g B x and A x li i i i
Ž .P x s B.i
In what follows, by Tulcea's approximation theorems for upper semicon-
tinuous set-valued mappings in locally convex topological vector spaces, we
will establish one general existence theorem of equilibria for abstract
economies in which the constraint mappings are upper semicontinuous in
locally convex topological vector spaces. Our result generalizes many
results in the existing literature by relaxing the compactness of strategy
spaces and the openness of graphs or open lower or open upper sections of
constraint correspondences. For example, the following Theorems 3.6 and
w x3.7 both generalize Corollary 3 of Borglin and Keiding 3, p. 315 , the
w xTheorem of Shafer and Sonnenschein 14, p. 374 , and the corresponding
w x w xresults given by Zheng 25 and Zhou 26 and related references therein.
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Now we have the following main existence theorem for equilibria
without the assumption on lower semicontinuity for the preference map-
pings and in which the constraint mappings are only upper semicon-
tinuous.
Ž .THEOREM 3.6. Let G s X ; F ; P be a generalized game such that Xi i i ig I
Ž .is paracompact and each X has property K , where I may be an uncountablei
set of players. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied for each
i g I:
Ž .i the strategic set X is a nonempty closed con¤ex set in a Hausdorffi
locally topological ¤ector space;
Ž .ii the constraint mapping F is compact and upper semicontinuousi
with nonempty closed and con¤ex ¤alues;
Ž . X iiii the preference mapping P : X “ 2 is such that the mappingi
F l P is L-majorized;i i
Ž .  Ž . Ž . 4iv the set E s x g X : F x l P x / B is open and paracom-i i i
pact in X ;
Ž .v there exist a nonempty compact and con¤ex subset X and a0
nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each x g X _ K, there exists
Ž . Ž  4. Ž Ž . Ž ..y s y g co X j x such that y g Fco F x l P x for all i g I.i ig I 0 i i i
Ž .Then G has an equilibrium x in K ; i.e., there exists x g K such that x g F xÃ Ã Ã Ãi i
Ž . Ž .and F x l P x s B for all i g I.Ã Ãi i
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, there is a common filtering set J such that, for
Ž .every i g I, there exists a family F of regular correspondencesi j jg J
Ž . Ž .between X and X , such that both F and F are upperi i j jg J i j jg J
approximating families for F . Note that E is paracompact and F l P isi i i i
L-majorized on E from E to X . By Theorem 2.1, it follows that therei i i
X i Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž .exists an L-class mapping f : E “ 2 such that a F l P x ; f xi i i i i
Ž . Ž . y1Ž .and x f co f x for all x g X and b f y is compactly open in X fori i i
each y g X . For each j g J, define a set-valued mapping f : X “ 2 X i byi i j
f x s F x l f xŽ . Ž . Ž .i j i j i
for each x g X. Note that F is regular; it follows that F has an openi j i j
graph and thus the mapping f is of class L . Second, for each i g I, thei j
 Ž . Ž . 4 y1Ž . y1Ž .set x g X : F x l f x / B s D F y l f y , which isi j i j y g X i j ii
Ž .open in X. Therefore the game G s X ; F , F , f satisfies all hy-j i i j i j i j ig I
potheses of Theorem 3.5. It follows by Theorem 3.5 that G has anj
j j j j jŽ . Ž . Ž . Ž .equilibrium x g K such that F x l f x s B, and p x g F xÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãi j i i i j
Ž j. Ž j. Ž j. Ž j.for all i g I. Since F x ; F x , it follows that F x l f x s B.Ã Ã Ã Ãi i j i i
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 j4 c c  4Therefore x ; E , where the set E s x g X : x f E is closed in Xjg J i i i
Ž . Ž j.by condition iv . On the other hand, note that x is a net in theÃ jg J
Ž j.compact set K ; without loss of generality, we may assume that xÃ jg J
converges to x* g K. Then, for each i g I, xU s lim x j. As x* g EcÃi jg J i i
Ž . Ž . jfor all i g I, it follows that F x* l P x* s B. Since x is an equilib-Ãi i
Ž . Ž .rium point of G and F is regular, for each x g X, cl F x s F x ,j i j i j i j
j j jŽ . Ž Ž .. Ž .therefore x g cl B x s F x . As F has a closed graph, it followsÃ Ã Ãi i j i j i j
UŽ . Ž .that x*, x g Graph F for every i g I. For each i g I, since cl Fi i j i j jg J
Ž . Ž .is an upper approximation family for F , it follows that F F x ; F xi jg J i j i
UŽ .for each x g X so that x*, x g Graph F . Therefore, for each i g I,i i
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .F x* l P x* s B and p x* g F x* and this completes the proof.i i i i
Remark 3.1. Due to the fact that each open subset of a perfectly
normal and paracompact set is paracompact by Theorem 5.1.28 of Engel-
w xking 7, p. 308 , as a special case of Theorem 3.6, we have the following
result.
Ž .THEOREM 3.7. Let G s X ; F ; P be a generalized game such that Xi i i ig I
Ž .is a perfectly normal and paracompact set and each X has property K , wherei
I may be any countable or uncountable set of players. Suppose that the
following conditions are satisfied for each i g I:
Ž .i the strategic set X is a nonempty closed con¤ex set in a Hausdorffi
locally con¤ex topological ¤ector space;
Ž .ii the constraint mapping F is compact and upper semicontinuousi
with nonempty closed and con¤ex ¤alues;
Ž .iii the mapping F l P is L-majorized;i i
Ž .  Ž . Ž . 4iv the set E s x g X : F x l P x / B is open in X ;i i i
Ž .v there exist a nonempty compact and con¤ex subset X and a0
nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each x g X _ K, there exists
Ž . Ž  4. Ž Ž . Ž ..y s y g co X j x such that y g Fco F x l P x for all i g I.i ig I 0 i i i
Ž .Then G has an equilibrium x in K ; i.e., there exists x g K such that x g F xÃ Ã Ã Ãi i
Ž . Ž .and F x l P x s B for all i g I.Ã Ãi i
Ž .Proof. By condition iv , the set E is open in X for all i g I. Note thati
X is perfectly normal paracompact; it follows that E is also paracompact.i
Thus all hypotheses of Theorem 3.6 are satisfied. By Theorem 3.6, the
conclusion follows.
Note that each metrizable space is perfectly normal and paracompact by
w xTheorem 4.1.13 of Engelking 7, p. 254 , as an application of either
Theorem 3.6 or Theorem 3.7, we have the following.
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Ž .THEOREM 3.8. Let G s X ; F ; P be a generalized game such that Xi i i ig I
Ž .is metrizable and each X has property K . Suppose that the followingi
conditions are satisfied for each i g I:
Ž . Ži the strategic set X is a nonempty closed con¤ex set indeed, it isi
.metrizable in a Hausdorff locally topological ¤ector space;
Ž .ii the constraint mapping F is compact and upper semicontinuousi
with nonempty closed and con¤ex ¤alues;
Ž .iii the mapping F l P is L-majorized;i i
Ž .  Ž . Ž . 4iv the set E s x g X : F x l P x / B is open in X ;i i i
Ž .v there exist a nonempty compact and con¤ex subset X and a0
nonempty compact subset K of X such that, for each x g X _ K, there exists
Ž . Ž  4. Ž Ž . Ž ..y s y g co X j x such that y g Fco F x l P x for all i g I.i ig I 0 i i i
Ž . Ž . Ž .Then G has an equilibrium x in K such that x g F x and F x l P x s BÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i
for all i g I.
Remark 3.2. We first note that the assumption X is metrizable in
Theorem 3.8 is equivalent to saying that ``the index set I is countable and
X is metrizable for each i g I.''i
w xIn a recent paper by Zhou 26 , he also proves some existence theorems
of equilibria for generalized games by assuming that constraint mappings
Ž .have upper semicontinuity plus they also satisfy so-called e-CS and CS -
properties which look somehow like variant versions of fixed point free
property for set-valued mappings; and in this way, a further generalization,
Ž . w xthe so-called LSC -property, has been introduced by Zheng 25 . In
general, these properties are not easy to verify. However, our Theorems
w x3.7 and 3.8 generalize the corresponding Corollary 1 of Zhou 26 in the
following ways: that the strategic sets may not be compact and the set of
Ž .players resp., agents may not be countable.
As compact versions of both Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.8, we have the
following corollaries.
Ž .COROLLARY 3.9. Let G s X ; F ; P be a generalized game, where Ii i i ig I
may be an uncountable set of players. Suppose that the following conditions
are satisfied for each i g I:
Ž .i the strategic set X is a nonempty compact and con¤ex set in ai
Hausdorff locally topological ¤ector space;
Ž .ii the constraint mapping F is upper semicontinuous with nonemptyi
closed and con¤ex ¤alues;
Ž .iii the mapping F l P is L-majorized;i i
Ž .  Ž . Ž . 4iv the set E s x g X : F x l P x / B is open and paracom-i i i
pact in X.
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Ž . Ž . Ž .Then G has an equilibrium x in K such that x g F x and F x l P x s BÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i
for all i g I.
w xCorollary 3.9 generalizes Corollary 1 of Zhou 26 to a case that the set
Ž .of players resp., agents may not be countable.
Ž .COROLLARY 3.10. Let G s X ; F ; P be a generalized game, wherei i i ig I
the I is a countable set of players. Suppose that the following conditions are
satisfied for each i g I:
Ž .i the strategic set X is a metrizable compact and con¤ex set in ai
Hausdorff locally topological ¤ector space;
Ž .ii the constraint mapping F is upper semicontinuous with nonemptyi
closed and con¤ex ¤alues;
Ž .iii the mapping F l P is L-majorized;i i
Ž .  Ž . Ž . 4iv the set E s x g X : F x l P x / B is open in X.i i i
Ž . Ž . Ž .Then G has an equilibrium x in K such that x g F x and F x l P x s BÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i
for all i g I.
Finally, as a special case of Theorem 3.6, we have the following famous
Fan]Glicksberg fixed point theorem.
COROLLARY 3.11. Let X be a nonempty compact con¤ex set in a Haus-
dorff locally topological ¤ector space and let F: X “ 2 X be an upper
semicontinuous set-¤alued mapping with nonempty closed ¤alues. Then F has
at least one fixed point in X.
X Ž .Proof. Define P: X “ 2 by P x s B for each x g X. Then the
conclusion follows from Theorem 3.6.
Finally we note that Theorems 3.6 and 3.7 show that the corresponding
w x Žexistence results of equilibria for generalized games due to Zhou 26 e.g.,
. Ž .see Corollary 1 still hold when the set of players resp., agents is
Ž .uncountable instead of countable and the strategic resp., commodity
spaces may not be compact; however, we need one extra hypothesis,
Žso-called paracompactness of course this hypothesis is automatically satis-
.fied when the space X is metrizable , but we do not know whether the
Ž .conclusion of Theorem 3.6 resp., Theorem 3.7 still holds without the
Ž .paracompact hypothesis on the set E for each i g I in condition iv .i
We also note that by using Michael type continuous selection theorems
and their generalized versions plus the Himmelberg fixed point theorem in
w x10 , which is a different approach compared with approximate method
w x w xused in this paper and by Tulcea 18 and Tan and Yuan 15 , some
Ž .existence of equilibria for generalized games resp., abstract economics
w x w x w xhave been established by Kim and Lee 12 , Wu 19 , Wu and Shen 20 ,
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w x w xZheng 25 , and Zhou 26 ; however, the shortage or their methods is that,
in general, it needs to assume that either constraint andror preference
mappings have lower semicontinuity or even stronger hypotheses such as
having lower open sections.
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